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Workers' Compensation
H. Alston Johnson*

1. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

There were only a few developments of note in the 1993 Regular Session
of the Louisiana Legislature, and they can be summarized very briefly.
Legislation significantly strengthened the requirements for group self-insurance
funds, doubling the net worth requirement for a group from $500,000 to $1
million as of January 1, 1994, imposing certain restrictions on the distribution of
any surplus funds at the end of a fiscal year, and redefining the requirements for
excess coverage for such groups.' There was no change, however, in the
requirement that members of such a group simply be "members of the same bona
fide trade or professional association" without actually being "engaged in the
same or similar type of business,"2 the
additional qualification having been
3
deleted by legislation enacted in 1991.
Another act provided that the remedy granted to a worker for retaliatory
discharge (termination or refusal to hire because of the filing of a compensation
claim) "shall not limit or in any way affect" any other state or federal remedy,
but also provided that a person bringing a frivolous claim for retaliatory
discharge will be held responsible for reasonable damages, including attorney's
fees and court costs.4 The legislature also passed measures providing penalties
for employers who misrepresent that they have provided compensation insurance
and hefty fines for employers or claimants who make misrepresentations to
defeat or obtain benefits.
The remaining enactments were of somewhat more substance, but still rather
minor. Act 884 filled a gap in the procedure employed by administrative hearing
officers, to provide for enforcement of their orders through district judges if
necessary.6 Finally, Act 928 defined the term "professional athlete" for
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1. 1993 La. Acts No. 351, § I (amending La. R.S. 23:1191 (Supp. 1993) and 23:1192 (Supp.
1993)); 1993 La. Acts No. 880, § I (amending La. R.S. 23:1192(A)(6) (Supp. 1993)).
2. La. R.S. 23:1191(A) (Supp. 1993).
3. 1991 La. Acts No. 13, § 1 (amending La. R.S. 23:1191(A) (Supp. 1993)).
4. 1993 La. Acts No. 638, § 1 (effective June 15, 1993, amending La. R.S. 23:1361 (Supp.
1993)).
5. 1993 La. Acts No. 828, § 1 (effective June 22, 1993, adding La. R.S. 23:1172.1 (Supp.
1993)); 1993 La. Acts No. 829, § I (effective June 22, 1993, amending La. R.S. 23:1208 (Supp.
1993)).
6. 1993 La. Acts No. 884, § 1 (amending La. R.S. 23:1310.7 (Supp. 1993)). Use of the district
courts to enforce the orders of the administrative hearing officers follows a pattern established in
other areas, such as having legislative contempt punished through the ordinary processes of the
district court. See La. R.S. 24:5 (1989). This is a method much to be preferred, using the entities
accustomed to such proceedings, rather than having the attempt made through administrative hearing
*
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compensation purposes (interestingly, limited to NFL football players),
introduced a specific provision relative to reductions in the benefits for such an
athlete when other benefits are available, and revised the text of the notice that
the employer must post about the availability of workers' compensation benefits
and the penalty for fraudulent action in obtaining or defeating such benefits.7
Taken in the narrow view of the constitutional requirement, it would appear that
Act 928 violates the constitutional provision that each bill contain only one
object.8
II. JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Employer: To Be or Not to Be a Third Person
As is almost always the case, one of the most litigated issues during this
term was whether the employer might be made to respond in tort for a workplace
injury. The casual student of workers' compensation law would think this a
very elementary question, to which the answer must be in the negative. The
veteran student knows it to be a complex question, one that is growing more
complex by the year.
The focus of this year's discussion is the usual fare: intentional torts and
other remedies against the employer outside of the Act. But there are a couple
of very important new twists that may be the harbingers of even more interesting
developments to come.
First, to matters of intentional tort. In this forum last year, 9 the decision by the
Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Gagnardv. Baldridge0 affirming a
trial court's awards both in tort and workers' compensation was criticized, and it
was suggested that the case be overruled at the first opportunity. A writ was
granted," and the supreme court reversed the decision allowing double recovery
during this term, although its rationale in doing so was somewhat unusual.' 2 The
defendant urged upon the supreme court the same basic argument that he had urged
upon both lower courts, viz., that if an employee brings an action based on an
intentional tort, the employee is not entitled to pursue benefits under the Workers'
Compensation Act. The supreme court, like the two lower courts, rejected this
argument as fashioned. Rather, it held that the employee could pursue both but
could not recover under both. In an instance in which an intentional tort recovery

officers or the legislature itself.
7. 1993 La. Acts No. 928, §§ 1-2 (amending La. R.S. 23:1021 (Supp. 1993), 23:1225 (Supp.
1993) and 23:1302 (1985)).
8. La. Const. art. III, § 15(A).
9. H. Alston Johnson, Workers' Compensation,Developments in the Law, 1991-1992, 53 La. L.
Rev. 1029, 1036-37 (1993).
10. 597 So. 2d 1269 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
11. 604 So. 2d 956 (La. 1992).
12. Gagnard v. Baldridge, 612 So. 2d 732 (La. 1993).
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is deemed to be appropriate, as in Gagnard,then the employer (if cast in judgment)
is entitled to a credit against the recovery for any sums paid on the basis of a
compensation claim.
Certainly there is much to support this view, and the supreme court's resolution
of the matter is immeasurably better than the decision of the lower courts to award
damages for both tort and workers' compensation without a credit to the employer.
There is an interesting implication from the decision, however, which may not have
been apparent to the court or to the parties. For years, it has been thought well
established that a third-person tortfeasor, when sued by an employee in tort for
damages resulting from a workplace injury, had no right to contribution or
indemnity from the employer. 3 The usual rationale given is that the Act does not
permit an employer to bear any tort damage for an ordinary workplace injury,
whether directly in a suit by the employee or indirectly by way of a contribution
demand from a person who is sued by the employee. To the surprise of many, the
Act actually makes no such statement, limiting itself to the provision that the
remedy granted to the employee is exclusive as to the employer, the principal or
their employees; nothing is said about a contribution claim by a defendant
tortfeasor against the employer. 4 It is the case law that has supplied the bar to
contribution or indemnity.
Since the Act itself does not specifically forbid contribution or indemnity
between the tortfeasor and the employer, the cases have had to devise other
rationales. In some of the early cases, it seemed that the court believed that the
remedy in compensation was based in contract, not tort; that the alleged tortfeasor
and the employer could therefore not possibly be joint tortfeasors; and that in the
absence of joint liability, there was no basis for contribution or indemnity. 5 In
other words, the compensation statutes had somehow "destroyed" the concept of
a tort between the employee and the employer in the workplace setting, replacing
it with a limited statutory remedy written into the employment contract.
This notion in turn offered the courts a way to distinguish a contribution or
indemnity claim in the workers' compensation setting from other instances of
immunity, in which such claims were permitted. For example, when the wife
who was a passenger in a vehicle driven by her husband and was injured in a
two-car accident sued the other driver's insurer, the immunity that prevented the
wife from suing her husband did not prohibit the other driver's insurer from
seeking contribution from the husband.' 6 The same result obtained when

13. The case most often cited for this proposition, though it was not the first so to hold, is
LeJeune v. Highlands Ins. Co., 287 So. 2d 531 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 290 So. 2d 903
(1974).
14. La. R.S. 23:1032(A) (Supp. 1993).
15. Sanderson v. Binnings Constr. Co., 172 So. 2d 721, 723 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965). The same
theme seems to be cited with approval in Bagwell v. South La. Elec. Co-op Ass'n, 228 So. 2d 555.
559 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), when the issue before the court was more an indemnity claim than
contribution.
16. Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So. 2d 122 (1965).
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children who were passengers in a vehicle driven by their mother and were
injured in a two-car accident sued the other driver through a proper representative; the immunity that kept the children from suing their parents did not prevent
a contribution claim by the other driver against the parents.' 7 In each instance,
the supreme court reasoned that the immunity was procedural in nature; a tort
had actually been committed, but there was a procedural bar to enforcing any
remedy as a result of the tort, and the immunity was a personal one within the
relationship (husband/wife, parent/child) envisioned by the statute. Thus, the
immunity had not "destroyed" the concept of tort between the "immunized"
persons, and the statute announcing the immunity did not prevent some third
person from suing the otherwise immune person for contribution or indemnity.
The immunity of the employer under the workers' compensation statutes has
never been so treated, and probably will not be after the Gagnarddecision. But
the notion that somehow the Compensation Act "destroys" the concept of tort
between the employer and the employee, at least when there are allegations of
intentional wrongdoing, is substantially discredited by the supreme court's
statement that "the employer in his capacity as tortfeasor owes his employee
damages." 8
One other point about the Gagnardopinion bears mention. In some recent
intermediate appellate cases,' 9 dissenting judges have purported to find authority
in Bazley v. Tortorich,20 a leading supreme court decision on intentional
conduct in the workplace setting, for the proposition that gross negligence and
employer violations of safety rules should be considered "intentional acts" for
which a tort remedy might be available. This position is not well taken, and
should not gain currency by being repeated. The portion of the Bazley opinion
to which these judges refer is the following statement:
After considering broader penalties that would have provided double
benefits for an employer's violation of a safety rule, failure to provide
a safety device required by law, or gross negligence on the part of a
supervisory employee... our legislature chose to impose a sanction for
intentional wrongs by making the exclusive remedy rule inapplicable to
such acts.2

17. Walker v. Milton, 263 La. 555, 268 So. 2d 654 (1972).
18. Gagnard v. Baldridge, 612 So. 2d 732, 736 (La. 1993). One might find damage to the
concept as well in Williams v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 611 So. 2d 1383 (La. 1993), in which the
supreme court held that an employer for a compensation claim and a tortfeasor for a tort,
respectively, are solidarily bound to the employee/tort claimant because they are "obliged to the same
thing." Id. at 1387 (quoting Hoefly v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575, 576 (La.
1982)).
19. See Adams v. Time Saver Stores, Inc., 615 So. 2d 460, 464-65 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (Jones, J.,
dissenting), writ denied, 617 So. 2d 910 (1993); Armstead v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 609 So. 2d 965,
967-72 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992) (Waltzer, J., dissenting).
20. 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981).
21. Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475, 480 (La. 1981) (citation omitted).
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These judges believe that "such acts" at the close of this excerpt must refer
to "violation of a safety rule, failure to provide a safety device required by law
or gross negligence on the part of a supervisory employee," thus leading to the
conclusion that the inapplicability of the exclusive remedy rule must govern them
as well. In light of the legislative history of the amendment by which the
intentional tort provision was put into the Act, 22 this interpretation stretches
Justice Dennis' words beyond any plausible meaning. The legislature was
invited to consider a sanction other than a tort suit against the employer for gross
negligence, safety violations, and the like and rejected that alternative in favor
of a tort suit for intentional conduct only. Justice Dennis' reference of "such
acts" could only mean the "intentional wrongs" which he mentions earlier in the
same sentence. The legislature had an opportunity to remove gross negligence,
safety violations, and the like from the purview of the compensation statutes and
wisely chose not to do so; misinterpretation of Justice Dennis' opinion in Bazley
should not be permitted to change that legislative choice.
The issue of the employer as a third person is discussed collaterally in
another intentional act case. In Trahan v. Trans-Louisiana Gas Co.,23 the
appellate court reversed an exception of no cause of action that had been
sustained in the employer's favor on a tort claim asserting "neuro-toxic" injuries
from exposure to certain chemicals. The court reasoned that the allegations that
the employer knew to a virtual certainty that the exposure would occur and
would cause injury were sufficient to state a cause of action. The employee's
spouse had asserted a loss of consortium claim as well, and in keeping with
current jurisprudence,24 the exception was overruled as to that claim because it
was deemed to be derivative from the employee's claim and thus was to be
treated in the same fashion.
But the spouse also asserted a claim for her own exposure to the allegedly
hazardous chemicals because of her handling of her husband's clothing. The
trial court had sustained an exception of no cause of action as to that claim as
well, but the appellate court properly reversed. As to the direct claim of a nonemployee, the employer is clearly a third person subject to suit in tort.25
Another decision early in this term may perhaps prove to be the most important
in a number of years, and speaks directly to the question of when the employer
is a "third person" for purposes of claims outside the compensation statutes. In
Cox v. Glazer Steel Corp.,2 6 the supreme court held that the settlement by a

22. Wex S. Malone and H. Alston Johnson, Ill. Louisiana Workers' Compensation Law and

Practice § 365, in 14 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (Supp. 1993).
23. 618 So. 2d 30 (La. App, 3d Cir. 1993).
24. See Redding v. Essex Crane Rental Corp., 500 So. 2d 880 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986), writ
denied, 501 So. 2d 774 (1987); Theriot v.Damson Drilling Corp., 471 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 472 So. 2d 907 (1985).
25. See Malone and Johnson, supra note 22, at n.87.20 (Supp. 1993) and Cushing v. Time Saver
Stores, Inc., 552 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989), writ denied, 556 So. 2d 1281 (1990).
26. 606 So. 2d 518 (La. 1992).
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worker of his potential tort and compensation claims against his employer arising
out of a hand injury did not preclude a subsequent suit under Louisiana Revised
Statutes 46:2251 for discrimination against the handicapped when he alleged that
his employer then refused to re-hire him because of the consequences of that
workplace injury. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032(B) exempts from the
exclusive remedy of the act, in addition to liability resulting from an intentional
act, liability to a "fine or penalty under any other statute .
"..."27
The supreme
court held in Cox that this provision does not bar "other statutory causes of
action,"28 particularly those, unlike the compensation remedy, which are based
in fault.
The holding in Cox predictably led promptly to attempts to expand this
concept to reach other statutory penalties. In Billiot v. BP Oil Co.,29 the
claimant sought punitive damages against his employer on the basis of reckless
disregard of public safety in the handling of hazardous substances, and argued
that Cox dictated that this "penalty" against the employer falls outside of the
compensation statutes. Both lower courts rejected the argument, but the supreme
court granted a writ,3" and the matter is pending as this article is written.
Finally, some brief comment should be made about Gauthier v. O'Brien,3'
which is certainly the subject of more extended discussion elsewhere in this
symposium. Following the 1987 amendment to Article 2324 addressing the issue
of assigning percentages of fault to statutorily immune parties such as an
employer when the employee sues a tortfeasor, it had been unclear whether the
supreme court would adhere to its pre-1987 view that no percentage of fault
should be assigned to an employer under those circumstances. 32 The appellate
courts had divided in their views of the post-1987 provision.3 3 In Gauthier,the
supreme court held that the 1987 amendment required that a percentage of fault
be assigned to the employer, if appropriate, even though the employer might not
be (and probably would not be) a party to the litigation. But because of the
jurisprudential immunity of the employer from contribution claims by the
tortfeasor, no actual responsibility could be assigned to the employer. Rather,
the percentage of responsibility assigned to the employer should be "reallocated"

27. In its entirety, La. R.S. 23:1032(B) (Supp. 1993) provides: "Nothing in this Chapter shall
affect the liability of the employer, or any officer, director, stockholder, partner or employee of such
employer or principal to a fine or penalty under any other statute or the liability, civil or criminal,
resulting from an intentional act."
28. Cox, 606 So. 2d at 520.
29. 617 So. 2d 28 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
30. 619 So. 2d 558 (La. 1993).
31. 618 So. 2d 825 (La. 1993).
32. This view had been expressed in Guidry v. Frank Guidry Oil Co., 579 So. 2d 947 (La. 1991)
and Melton v. General Elec. Co., 579 So. 2d 448 (La. 1991).
33. The first circuit thought quantification of employer fault should occur, Crane v. Exxon Corp.,
613 So. 2d 214 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1992); Jarreau v. City of Baton .Rouge, 602 So. 2d 1124 (La. App.
Ist Cir. 1992), and the third circuit did not, Gauthier v. O'Brien, 606 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1992), rev'd, 618 So. 2d 825 (1993).
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to the other blameworthy parties, including the plaintiff if appropriate, in the
ratio that their respective percentages of fault bore to each other. Thus it seems
fair to say that in post-1987 cases, the employer is a third person to whom some
responsibility may be mathematically assigned, but the employer is not a third
person for actual tort liability or for contribution toward tort liability.
B. Rights of an Intervening Employer or Carrier
About six years ago, the supreme court decided in Brooks v. Chicola3 that
reimbursement of the compensation carrier or employer for benefits paid must
be limited to the damage awards made in a tort action for loss of earnings and
medical expenses, and could not be exacted from a general damage award. This
was a departure from a well-established practice and was criticized in this forum
at that time.35 Shortly thereafter, the legislature restored the law to its prior
meaning and effectively overruled Brooks.36 But in the interim, several
decisions dealt with the law as it stood between Brooks and the legislative
amendment.
The most important of these decisions were the companion cases of St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Smith 37 and Crowley v. City of Lafayette,3"
in which the supreme court correctly held that the amendment was substantive
in nature and could not be applied retroactively. That principle forced the court
in Ardoin v. Martin39 to grapple with the issue of proper allocation of a tort
award between an intervening carrier and the injured employee when the tort
award for lost wages and medical expenses alone was greater than the fund
available to satisfy the debt.
In Ardoin, the employee was injured in an automobile accident with the
defendant driver and brought a tort suit against the driver and his insurer,
Allstate. The compensation carrier intervened seeking to recover benefits that
it had paid to the employee, which at the time of trial amounted to some
$63,000. Allstate deposited the balance of the policy limits in the registry of the
court, totalling some $30,000; no explanation is given in the opinion as to the
disposition of any balance of the policy proceeds prior to the deposit. In time,
a rather substantial award was made in the tort suit, exceeding $300,000. But

34. 514 So. 2d 7 (La. 1987).
35. H. Alston Johnson, Workers' Compensation, Developments in the Law, 1987-1988, 49 La. L.
Rev. 549, 560-64 (1988).
36. 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 4, adding La. R.S. 23:1103(B) (Supp. 1993) to read:
The claim of the employer shall be satisfied in the manner described above from the first
dollar of the judgment without regard to how the damages have been itemized or
classified by the judge or jury. Such first dollar satisfaction shall be paid from the entire
judgment, regardless of whether the judgment includes compensation for losses other than
medical expenses and lost wages.
37. 609 So. 2d 809 (La. 1992).
38. 609 So. 2d 199 (La. 1992).
39. 612 So. 2d 982 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
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$250,000 of that sum was for general damages, not available to satisfy the
reimbursement claim of the carrier under Brooks. Predictably, the carrier wanted
all $30,000 of the deposit. The trial judge refused the request, limiting the
carrier to the percentage of the deposit corresponding to the ratio of the total
compensation benefits paid to the total tort award. The appellate court affirmed
that award.
Since the case was governed by Brooks, the appellate court probably made
the best of a bad situation, but the result is likely not consistent with the statute.
From the outset, Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1103(A) and its predecessors
have provided that when there is an intervention by the carrier and an award is
made, "such damages shall be so apportioned in the judgmeni that the claim of
the employer for the compensation actually paid shall take precedence over that
of the injured employee .... " It does not say that the claim of the employer
shall be shared ratably with that of the injured employee. Brooks held that when
the amount of weekly benefits paid exceeded the portion of the tort award for
past loss wages, the employer or carrier simply did not receive any more than
the past loss wages award. Brooks does not appear to be authority for
"converting" the tort fund available (the deposit in the registry of the court) into
the same categories and same proportions awarded by the trial court. In fact, the
trial judge awarded more than $60,000 for lost wages and medical expenses; the
compensation carrier had paid more than $63,000 for the same items; and some
$30,000 was available to satisfy the tort judgment in the registry of the court.
Permitting the carrier to receive the full $30,000 would not-violate Brooks; the
sum awardedwas not less than the benefits paid, as it had been in Brooks.
C. Defense of Substance Abuse
Louisiana courts have historically been extremely wary about the use of
employee fault to bar a compensation claim. In theory and in practice, employee
fault should indeed have a very small role in a compensation system arguably
based on no-fault principles. But we cannot ignore the fact that there are
statutory provisions that bar recovery in certain circumstances, and they have in
fact been expanded and strengthened in the Louisiana statutes in the last few
years.
A decision during this term, however, indicates that our courts may be
prepared to read the current version of these defenses just as narrowly as the
former versions were read.4" In Thompson v. Capital Steel Co., a drug test

40. For one of the most extreme examples of judicial refusal to interpret the defense in any but
the most narrow fashion, see Ray v. Superior Iron Works and Supply Co., 284 So. 2d 140 (La. App.
3d Cir.), writ denied, 286 So. 2d 365 (1973). It seems fair to conclude that the claimant in Ray was
quite intoxicated when he missed a curve and was injured in a one-car accident. But the court
refused to believe that his intoxication caused his injury, presumably on the dubious basis that asober
person might have missed the curve as well.
41. 613 So. 2d 178 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992), writ denied, 617 So. 2d 936 (1993).
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following the claimant's work injury revealed the presence of the primary active
ingredient in marijuana and the employer declined to pay benefits or medical
expenses on the basis of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1081. There seemed to
be no dispute that the testing procedures were sound, the chain of evidence was
proper, and the results indicated the likelihood that marijuana had been used
(though the claimant denied it). However, the hearing officer and the appellate
court agreed that the test results were inadmissible because they were not
obtained in a procedure pursuant to a "written and promulgated substance abuse
rule or policy established by the employer. 42 There was no evidence that the
rule or policy under which the testing occurred had been promulgated by the
employer, and thus the court felt forced to conclude that the test results so
obtained were inadmissible. Without those test results, the employer was unable
to discharge its burden of proving intoxication, and thus it did not enjoy the
benefit of the presumption of causation between intoxication
and injury
3
established by the amendments to Section 1081 in 1989.1
D. Prescription
A pair of interesting decisions during this term involving prescription
deserve brief mention. In Williams v. Sewerage & Water Board of New
Orleans," the supreme court held that a timely suit against the employer for
workers' compensation will interrupt prescription as to a tortfeasor for damages
arising out of the same incident when the tortfeasor is added by amendment more
than a year after the occurrence. This issue should probably have been regarded
as undecided prior to the opinion, at least insofar as the supreme court was
concerned. The supreme court's opinion rests largely on the conclusion that the
employer and a tortfeasor whose conduct combines to cause injury to the
employee should be regarded as solidarily bound to the employee, and thus a
timely suit against one of the solidary obligors interrupts prescription as to the
other.
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Ward,45 a Tennessee resident was
employed as a truck driver and was injured in an accident in Louisiana.46 The
compensation carrier paid benefits to the employee under Tennessee law. The
employee apparently never filed suit against the other driver in the accident, but
eighteen months after the accident the compensation carrier did-in Louisiana.
The carrier appeared to be operating under a Tennessee statute that specified that
the injured employee had one year to sue a tortfeasor, and that if he did not do
so, his claim was considered assigned to the employer or carrier to the extent of

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
but the

La. R.S. 23:1081(8) (Supp. 1993).
1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 3.
611 So. 2d 1383 (La. 1993).
612 So. 2d 964 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
It is unclear from the opinion whetherthe employer would be considered a Tennessee citizen,
implication seems to be that it was.
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the compensation paid. Under Tennessee law, the employer or carrier was given
an additional six months after this "assignment" to bring the claim.
Unfortunately for the carrier, a claim governed by Louisiana law would have
to be brought within the standard one-year liberative prescriptive period
applicable to tort claims. Thus, if the carrier's claim were governed by
Tennessee law (as the carrier claimed), it was timely. But if the carrier's claim
were governed by Louisiana law (as the defendant driver claimed), it was
prescribed.
The carrier argued mightily that it was caught between the proverbial rock
and a hard place. If it waited eighteen months to sue in Louisiana (as it had),
it risked a successful exception of prescription. If it sued within a year, it risked
the argument that its action was premature under Tennessee law, which required
it to wait one year to see if the injured employee would take action on his own
behalf. The court was not impressed. It reasoned that under either "traditional"47 or "modern ' 48 conflicts analysis, Louisiana should apply its own prescriptive rules to the controversy. That meant that a suit brought in a Louisiana court
eighteen months after the incident was untimely. One assumes that the carrier
should have brought its suit in Louisiana within twelve months of the incident
and then argued that Louisiana law rather than Tennessee law governed the
action, thus defeating the argument that it was acting "too soon" under Tennessee
law.

47. Former Louisiana Civil Code article 15, applicable to this litigation, stated that "the
prescription provided by the laws of this state applies to an obligation arising under the laws of
another jurisdiction which is sought to be enforced in this state." This effectively classifies
prescription as a procedural matter, permitting the forum state to use its own rules on the subject
regardless of the law that it might apply to the substance of the dispute.
48. The court described the "modem" trend as treating prescription or statutes of limitation as
substantive matters, and thus not necessarily to be that of the forum state. Rather, the applicable
statute of limitation should be that of the state whose law applies to the other substantive matters in
the case. In the court's mind, that was Louisiana, since the incident occurred in Louisiana.

